Our Body Works Regardless of Errors. So Should the Things We Design.
Or, what catastrophes can teach us about designing efficient systems
đ Hey there! My name is Abhishek. Welcome to a new edition of The Sunday Wisdom! This is the best way to learn new things with the least amount of effort.
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Q: Why do man-made disasters happen?
The Chernobyl disaster didnât happen simply because of Soviet Communist top-down regime. The Challenger disaster didnât happen simply because of the O-ring seals failure. The second wave of the Coronavirus didnât take over India simply due to lack of adequate healthcare in the country. A marketing strategy doesnât fail simply because you didnât include animal photos. These so called âroot causesâ are part of many reasons, and they are definitely not the main reason.
On 26 April 1986, a group of nuclear engineers wanted to test a simulation of an electrical power outage to create a safety procedure in a nuclear power plant. They wanted to test if it was possible to maintain the nuclear reactor cooling water circulation until the back-up electrical generators could provide power. The goal was to make sure the reactor wonât have to be completely shut down during power outage.
Three such tests had been conducted in the previous four years, but they had failed to provide a solution. This fourth attempt didnât happen as scheduled. An unplanned 10-hour delay caused a completely unprepared operating shift to handle the job.
The reactor power had to be decreased as part of the test. This meant disabled the safety system. But the power unexpectedly dropped to near-zero during the process. The operators could partially restore the power, but this put the reactor in an unstable condition.
Since the safety system was off, the risk wasnât evident. Moreover, the operating instructions didnât cover this use case, so the operators proceeded with the planned test.
Upon completion of the test, when they triggered the reactor to shut down, a combination of unstable conditions and reactor design flaws caused an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction. The rest, as they say, was the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.
On 28 March, seven years back and 7,600 km away, a group of nuclear power plant technicians accidentally got a bubble stuck in a sensor during a routine cleaning procedure. This stopped the coolant pumps from circulating water. There were auxiliary pumps to handle this situation, but they were closed for maintenance (in violation of the plantâs operating procedure).
Even though the reactor detected a problem and went into emergency shutdown mode, there was no water circulation and the heat in the system had nowhere to go. The pressure relief valve â whose job was to let out the excess pressure â suffered a mechanical failure and got stuck open, thereby permitting coolant water to escape from the system.
This wasnât detected by the technicians because the control room indicator light showed if the valve closing mechanism was powered on or off, not if the valve itself was open or closed. The open valve slowly leaked water necessary to cool the reactor and there was no extra water coming in.
There was, however, one coolant temperature sensor that was spiking in the control room. But the crewâs training for abnormal incidents directed them to refer other sensors, not this one. This chain of events caused the reactor to overheat for 11 hours. This led to a partial meltdown of the reactor and subsequent radiation leak in the Three Mile Island of the US.
When we do postmortems of both big and small failures, we heavily suffer from hindsight bias. Informed by Chaos Theory, we assume that avoiding the âroot causeâ of the disaster â the technicians being unprepared, or bubble getting stuck in the sensor â could have avoided the meltdown. What if they hadnât done that? What if they were more careful? This assumption is wrong.
In theory, yes, a buttery flapping its wings in Brazil can set off a tornado in Texas, but it doesnât mean that it will. There arenât as many tornadoes as butterfly flaps in real life â this bit is clear. By that logic, any random event can set off a series of events that can lead to some other event. But this knowledge doesnât help us in any way practically.
In real life, the human body, the environment, a society, an organisation, a business strategy, or a space shuttle, are examples of complex systems. Errors are normal in a complex system. They happen every day. Bubbles get stuck, coolant systems fail, technicians ignore procedures. But thereâs enough redundancy and margin of error in place to make sure such errors donât collapse the whole system.
Catastrophic failures happen only when enough of these small errors line up, leading to a compounding effect via a chain reaction. Catastrophic failures â whenever they occur â happen regardless of a âroot causeâ.
By that logic, the Challenger disaster didnât happen simply because of the O-ring seals failure. The second wave of the Coronavirus didnât take over India simply due to lack of adequate healthcare in the country. A marketing strategy doesnât fail simply because you didnât include animal photos.
These so called âroot causesâ are part of many reasons, and they are definitely not the main reason. If you look closely, there are 500 other things that were erroneous but didnât contribute to the disaster. In a complex system â where there are multiple moving parts â there is no âroot causeâ. In other words, avoiding them wouldnât have been enough to avoid the disaster. It might have been delayed, but not prevented.
Catastrophic failures are usually due to a combination of bad system design, human error, human-computer interaction flaws, poor training, miscommunication, bad process, and countless other major and minor contributing factors. Thereâs seldom one major factor which has a cascading effect.
The same is true for success as well. A company doesnât become successful just because it has a great CEO. You donât have a healthy relationship just because you are a nice person. You donât win a competition just because you worked hard. There are multiple other factors â some of which are outside your control.
Therefore, the goal isnât to make completely error-free systems. Itâs impossible to make them completely free of error anyway. Itâs hubris to even attempt that â be it a personal fitness regime, or the product development process in a startup, or the service design of an airport. What you should thrive for is to make them error-proof. Systems that work regardless of errors.
A good system helps you stay healthy regardless of occasional drinking and partying. A good system helps you get more done regardless of procrastination. A good system helps you ship the MVP regardless of developmental hiccups.
Every day, between one and five of your cells in your body turn cancerous. But your immune system is efficient enough to capture and kill them. Think of that. A couple of dozen times a week, well over a thousand times a year, you get the most dreaded disease of our age, and each time your body self-corrects.
The body works regardless of errors. So should the systems we design.
Interesting Finds
The secret to a meaningful life is simpler than you think. People are mistaken when they feel their lives are meaningless. The error is based on their failure to recognise what does matter, instead becoming overly focused on what they believe is missing from their existence. Most of the people who complained about lifeâs meaninglessness even found it difficult to explain what they took the notion to mean.
We canât trust science any more. This film dismantles the machinations that aim to turn science against itself. With the help of declassified archives and testimonies from experts, lobbyists and politicians, this investigation plunges into the science of doubt. Along with a team of experts, including philosophers, economists, cognitive scientists, politicians, and scholars, it explores concrete examples of how doubt can be sown.
Quote to Note
Do we see ourselves as victims or victors? A victim: The cards went against me. Things are being done to me, things are happening around me, and I am neither to blame nor in control. A victor: I made the correct decision. Sure, the outcome didnât go my way, but I thought correctly under pressure. And thatâs the skill I can control.
â Maria Konnikova, The Biggest Bluff
Timeless Wisdom
5 bad money practices to avoid:
Debt.
Fiscally irresponsible people. Donât befriend or marry one. Least of all, donât give them access to your wealth.
Bets with low upside and high downside.
Non-essential spending. Trust me, you donât need 80% of the things you own.
Financial advisors. Read and learn to become your own advisor. You donât have to be an expert. Nobodyâs an expert.
Before You GoâŚ
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Iâll see you next Sunday,
Abhishek đ
This is great, we should asume systems will tend to chaos and prepare for it. Thanks!